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THE McDONALD'S ANTITRUST LITIGATION:
REAL ESTATE TYING AGREEMENTS IN
TRADEMARK FRANCHISING
INTRODUCTION

Trademark' franchising 2 is the system whereby the owner
of a valuable and recognizable trademark, the franchisor,
licenses its use to independent businessmen, 3 franchisees, in return for the assurance that retail outlets displaying such trademark will be operated in accordance with the detailed
instructions of the franchisor. The popularity of this system
stems from the economic advantages offered to both parties.
The franchisor is able to rapidly create a vast distribution system,4 while the franchisee can operate his own business with a
minimal initial capital investment. 5 Furthermore, the franchisee may avoid the usual difficulties encountered in the development of a new business by acquiring a recognized,
immediately established franchise.
Yet, aspects of this aggregate franchising system have collided with modern antitrust laws and must be scrutinized ac1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1665 (4th ed. 1968) defines trademark as
follows: "Generally speaking, a distinctive mark of authenticity, through
which the products of particular manufacturers or the vendible commodities of particular merchants may be distinguished from those of others."
2. Although several types of franchising exist, notably in distribution
or manufacturing forms, this comment deals solely with the retail chain
form of franchising, where a franchisor offers a standardized product
through local retail outlets. The popular fast-food chains are exemplary.
See Garlick, Pure Franchising,Control and the Antitrust Laws. Friendsor
Foes?, 48 J. URB. L. 835, 837-42 (1971). For a history of the franchise system
in the United States, see E. LEWIS & R. HANCOCK, THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM OF
DISmmUrION 10-17 (1963).
3. The franchisee has been considered in a unique business position,
falling somewhere between an agent and an independent entrepeneur. See
McCarthy, TrademarkFranchisingand Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie-Ins,
58 CALIF. L. REV.1085, 1086-87 (1970) [hereinafter cited as McCarthy].
4. See J. CURRY, PARTNERS FOR PROFIT: A STUnY OF FRANCHISING 95
(1966) (franchisors' major response in survey of franchising advantages).
5. One court has noted that "[t]he franchise method of operation has
the advantage, from the standpoint of our American system of competitive
economy, of enabling numerous groups of individuals to become entrepeneurs." Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
affid, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
381 U.S. 125 (1965). Other advantages include market research, product recognition, advertisement, and real estate development. See H. BROWN,
FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING 3-4 (1970).
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cordingly.6 Many trademark franchising agreements have
contained stringent restrictions on the rights of franchisees to
acquire necessary supplies and services. 7 Often, such restrictions have been interpreted as violating the prohibition against
tying arrangements under section 1 of the Sherman Act.8 Tying
arrangements condition the availability of the tying product on
purchase of the tied product. 9 Such an arrangement restricts
competition in the tied product market not because of superiority of the tied product item, but because of the leverage exerted
by the highly attractive tying product.' 0 This has led the
Supreme Court to conclude, in an oft-quoted passage, that "tying arrangements serve hardly any purpose other than the suppression of competition.""
Throughout the last decade, many antitrust plaintiffs have
alleged that franchisors, in addition to requiring franchisees to
purchase needed yet unwanted supplies and services, have
forced them to execute long-term leasing agreements as a condi6. For an analysis of antitrust problems which have developed in light
of the tremendous growth of franchising, see generally D. THOMPSON,
FRANCHISE OPERATIONS AND ANTITRUST 32 (1971); Comment, Antitrust Barrier To Franchising,61 GEo. L.J. 189 (1972).
7. See, e.g. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (mixes, packaging); Martino v. McDonald's
Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. 111. 1979) (Coca-Cola); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins
Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (ice cream products).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations is declared to be illeg al . .. . "
The Supreme Court has construed this provision as precluding only
those contracts which "unreasonably" restrain trade. Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Although tying arrangements are viola-

tive of both section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act,
the majority of complaints have been filed under the former. Section 3 of
the Clayton Act, in contrast, provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of
goods, wares, merchandise,machinery, supplies, or other commodities,
whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within
the United States ... where the effect of such lease, sale or contract for
sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970) (emphasis added).
9. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
In the Supreme Court's initial exposure to the separability problem, the
Court rejected an illegal tie-in of advertising claim, finding an afternoon
newspaper inseparable from earlier editions. See also Note, Definition of
the Market in Tying Arrangements: Another Aspect of Times-Picayune, 63

L.J. 389 (1954) (new standard of legality under Sherman Act).
10. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).

YALE

11. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
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tion to obtaining the use of their trademarks. 12 It has often been
contended that such leasing agreements are laden with onerous
terms.' 3 The validity of leasehold agreements in the trademark
franchising context must initially be examined in terms of both
economic and legal considerations. 14 Through long-term leasehold arrangements, the franchisor has developed a mechanism
for deferring the cost of purchasing an established business over
an extended period of time. 15 As such, the major advantage of
the system to the franchisee, low initial capital investment, can
be sustained.' 6 However, courts faced with enforcing the Sherman Act 17 have been generally unwilling to differentiate
franchising systems from various other market arrangements.' 8
The franchising system of the McDonald's Corporation (McDonald's) is currently being challenged in four separate anti19
trust suits instituted in the United States district courts.
20
Although various antitrust violations have been alleged, the
central question in all four actions is whether requiring franchisees to execute a lease of the underlying premises as a condi12. See, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, 537 F.2d
1307 (5th Cir. 1976); Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc.,
81 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78

F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978). See note 26 infra.

13. See note 26 and accompanying text infra. See also Abecrombie v.
Lum's, Inc., 531 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1976) (5% of gross sales).
14. Many commentaries have dealt with the economic and legal
implications of tying arrangements in trademark franchising. See, e.g.,
Steutermann, Selected Antitrust Aspects of Trademark Franchising,60 Ky.
L.J. 638, 669-70 (1972) (legality of restraints must be viewed in terms of facts
and circumstances surrounding franchise system; leverage must be used
with utmost caution and must be judged according to its legitimate business purpose); Comment, Antitrust Barriers to Franchising,61 GEO. L.J.
189, 199 (1972) (per se rule inappropriate and potentially harmful to
franchisors and consumers alike); Note, Antitrust Problems in Trademark
Franchising,17 STAN. L. REV. 926, 941 (1965) (licensor and consumer interests to some extent opposed to licensee and supplier interests).
15. See text accompanying note 24 infra.
16. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
18. See Ross, The Single ProductIssue in Antitrust Tying: A Functional
Approach, 23 EMORY L.J. 963, 994-1000 (1974) (per se treatment is not unmerited; a trademark which is utilized to compel the purchase of additional
products evidences "that particular form of market power justifiably condemned as leverage").
19. Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Kypta

v. McDonald's Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas.

62,827 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 1979);

Principe v. McDonald's Corp., No. 78-0601 (E.D. Va. July 27, 1979); Levine v.
McDonald's Corp., No. 77-601 (D. Ariz. July 26, 1977).
20. See text accompanying notes 32-45 infra. In addition to claims involving the illegal tie-ins of real estate, plaintiffs in the various suits alleged
tie-ins of advertising, equipment, Coca-Cola, security deposits, and general
supplies. This comment, however, will only deal directly with the real es-

tate claims.
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tion to obtaining a franchise coupled with the attendant right to
use the McDonald's trademark constitutes a violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act?
This comment will explore the development of each element
of a traditional tying claim and ascertain the applicability of
such analysis to trademark franchising. Specifically, each element will be analyzed in terms of the particular leasing requirements currently being challenged in the McDonald's antitrust
litigation.
THE McDONALD'S ANTITRUST LITIGATION

McDonald's Real Estate Policy
The history of McDonald's real estate policy dates back to
1954 when Ray Kroc entered into an agreement with the McDonald brothers of California to license McDonald's franchises for a
fee of 1.9 per cent of gross sales. 2 1 As McDonald's corporate
profits proved insufficient, the Franchise Realty Corporation
was formed in 1956 to obtain sufficient real estate for McDonald's franchises. 22 McDonald's would induce property owners to
lease their land to the corporation on a subordinated basis; the
lessor would take back a second mortgage so that McDonald's
could procure a first mortgage with the land being subordinated
to building.23 The first mortgage would be for a maximum period of ten years, whereas the leases by McDonald's on all the
properties were for twenty years. 24 A formula was devised
whereby monthly payments by franchisees covered McDonald's
mortgage and other expenses and provided a profit.25 McDonald's received a minimum monthly total or a percentage of the
franchisee's gross volume, whichever was greater. 26 After the
initial ten-year period, McDonald's mortgage was paid off and
21. Conley Deposition at 14, Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D.
81 (N.D. Ill. 1979).

22. Prior to 1961, some 25 franchisees neither leased nor subleased from
Franchise Realty Corporation. Around this time, however, McDonald's de-

cided that there would be no more exceptions to its policy. Id. at 19.
23. R. KRoc, GRINDING IT OUT, THE MAKING OF McDoNALD's 83-103
(1977) [hereinafter cited as GRINDING IT OUT] (Ray Kroc's description of the
marketing scheme as the stroke of financial genius of Harry Sonnenborne,
an early officer of the corporation).
24. Id. at 102-03.
25. Id. at 83.
26. Id. In Mr. Martino's 20 year lease, for example, he was required to
pay $1,100 per month fixed rental or 7% of monthly gross sales in excess of
$15,714.29, whichever was greater, plus all taxes, utilities, and a $15,000 security deposit. Defendant Realty was paying its lessor a monthly rental of
$766.67. Exhibit 9, Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
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27
the income from the franchisee was clear profit.

McDonald's policy was implemented through execution of
franchise letter agreements 28 which expressly conditioned the
franchise grant upon the execution of an attached license 2 9 and
leasing agreement.3 0 Over the last twenty years, 31McDonald's
real estate policy has generally remained uniform.
The Current Litigation
32
In the four suits filed in the United States district courts,
each complaint alleged that McDonald's real estate policy of disallowing the franchisee to rent directly from the property owner
constituted a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 33 In Martino v. McDonald's System, Inc.,34 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois certified a class consisting of all franchisees who acquired franchises after McDon-

27. See GRINDING IT OUT, supra note 23, at 102-03.
28. Provisions of a McDonald's franchise letter agreement read as follows:
McDonald's Corporation ... and its subsidiaries are developing a
. Construction of this
McDonald's restaurant located at
. We are hereby offering you a
restaurant commenced on
Franchise to operate the above-mentioned restaurant, subject to the
terms and conditions set forth below.
1. This Franchise is granted to you only for the operation of the
McDonald's restaurant at the above described address and the rights
granted under the Franchise are limited to this restaurantlocation.
3. ... Upon your acceptance of this FranchiseLetter Agreement,
you do hereby agree to the provisions of, and do hereby agree to execute
the License and Lease attached hereto as Exhibits A and B subject to
the insertion by McDonald's of dates and commencement and termination when said dates are ascertained and any adjustment of the
amounts set forth in paragraph 4(c) hereof as well as a finalized legal
description of the property.
Your acceptance of this FranchiseLetter Agreement is specifically
conditioned upon and subject to your execution of the License and

Lease attached as Exhibits A and B, and unless said documents are

executed by you and received by McDonald's within fifteen (15) days of
the date hereof McDonald's shall, without further action, deem this
Franchise Letter Agreement shall be null and void and of no further
force and effect.
Exhibit 19, Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (em-

phasis added).

29. The license agreement specifically identifies the location of the
franchise in accordance with its legal description. Exhibit 8, Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
30. See note 26 supra.

31. See Exhibit 25, Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81 (N.D.
Ill. 1979) (1976 license agreement, similar provisions).
32. See note 19 supra.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
1979).
34. 81 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ill.
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ald's had uniformly established its real estate policy. 35 Kypta v.
McDonald's Corp.36 was commenced in the southern district of
Florida as a class action on behalf of all present and former franchisees in the United States. The district court, however, denied
the plaintiffs' motion for class certification regarding their real
37
estate tying claim.
In Levine v. McDonald's Corp.,38 filed in the district court of
Arizona on behalf of five area franchisees, plaintiffs alleged a
conspiracy to restrain interstate trade and monopolization in violation of sections 139 and 2 40 of the Sherman Act, respectively.
The complaint alleged that in futherance of these illegal activities, defendants tied the lease or sublease of the real estate
upon which the restaurant was located to the granting of the
franchise. The plaintiffs denied, however, that such tying allega41
tion constituted a separate claim.
In Principe v. McDonald's Corp.,4 2 plaintiffs pleaded violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act,43 alleging the unlawful
tying of leaseholds, similar in substance to the Illinois" and
Florida 45 claims. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the real estate tying claim, holding that the
grant of a franchise and the leasehold agreement did not constitute two separate products as required by the law of tying. 46 Alternatively, the district court held that McDonald's did not
possess the requisite economic power to fall within the scope of
47
the tying prohibition.
As the final determination of the McDonald's litigation will
have a tremendous impact on the franchising industry,4 8 an
analysis of the development of tying law and its applicability to
the field of trademark franchising is required.
35. Id. at 93.
36. 1979-2 Trade Cas.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

62,827 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 1979).

Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., No. 73-678 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 1977).
No. 77-601 (D. Ariz. July 26, 1977).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
Levine v. McDonald's Corp., No. 77-601 (D. Ariz. July 26, 1977).
No. 78-0601 (E.D. Va. July 27, 1979).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra.

46. Principe v. McDonald's Corp., No. 78-0601 (E.D. Va. July 27, 1979).
47. Id.
48. See notes 12-20 and accompanying text supra. The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation denied a motion to transfer the four McDonald's
suits for consolidated pretrial proceedings. In re McDonald's Franchise Antitrust Litigation, 472 F. Supp. 111 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1979).
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TYING AGREEMENTS AS PER SE VIOLATIONS
OF THE SHERMAN

AcT49

The Supreme Court of the United States has explicitly set
forth three basic requirements for the establishment of an ille-

50
gal tie-in: (1) a separate tying and tied product; (2) possession
by the seller of sufficient economic power in the tying product
market to appreciably restrain competition in the tied product
market;5 ' and (3) an agreement that must affect a "not insub52
stantial" amount of interstate commerce. In addition, most district courts have recently imposed the requirement of proving
that the defendant, by wielding his market power in the tying
product, "coerced"5 3 the plaintiff into taking the unwanted tied
product. Finally, courts have required the plaintiff to show "fact
of damage" 54 -- that he was injured as a result of defendant's an-

titrust violation.
Tying agreements, once established, have been deemed per
49. See note 8 and accompanying text supra. A tying agreement, while
subject to per se treatment under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1970) and section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), may also be
violative of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1) & (6)
(1970), as an "unfair method of competition," a lesser standard. See FTC v.
Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966). For a discussion of the elements of a
tying claim under the Sherman Act, see 14 A.L.R. Fed. 473 (1973).
50. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495, 507 (1969) (implicit within this element is the fact that availability of
tying product must be conditioned on purchase of tied product). See also
notes 70-99 and accompanying text infra.
51. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). See notes
100-35 and accompanying text infra.
52. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,
501 (1969); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
See notes 136-45 and accompanying test infra.
53. E.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1215 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) (concept of "coercion" often expressed in leading Supreme Court tying cases); Abecrombie v. Lum's, Inc.,
345 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (franchisees had to prove that they were
"coerced" and not merely persuaded into taking, purchasing, and leasing
requirements as a condition for using Lum's trademark). See notes 146-83
and accompanying text infra.
Although not specifically referred to as an element, "coercion" as a requirement in a tying claim can be inferred from various statements made
by the Supreme Court in tying cases. See Times v. Picayune Publishing Co.
v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), where the Court stated that "[bIy conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase of another, a seller
coerces the abdication of buyer's independent judgment as to the "tied"
product's merits and insulates it from the competitive stresses of the open
markets." Id. at 605. (emphasis added). See also note 147 infra.
54. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 454 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (business loss causally related to plaintiff's violation); Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, 537 F.2d 1307, 1321 (5th
Cir. 1976) (same). See notes 184-200 and accompanying text infra.
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se 55 violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act.56 Under the per se

approach, the imposition of a tie-in is deemed to violate antitrust
regulations without examination into the reasons for its use or
the anti-competitive effects upon the particular industry. 57 The
Supreme Court in Northern Pacific Railway v. United States58
explained that "[cjertain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
'59
harm they have caused or the business excuse of their use.

Even where a plaintiff fails to establish that the challenged practice is per se illegal, he may still prevail on the merits by proving
contravening
that the tie-in unreasonably restrains competition,
60
the general standards of the Sherman Act.
In the trademark franchise setting, the traditional per se approach used in products cases has been modified by allowing
the franchisor to justify6' the imposition of the tie-in. However,
courts have agreed that the burden of establishing any such justification rests wholly upon the franchisor. 62 Usually,
franchisors have claimed that tie-ins were needed to ensure that
the quality and uniqueness of the trademark product remained
uniform throughout the franchise setting.63 This argument has
55. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The per se
analysis adopted in Northern Pacific has been regarded by most courts as
the fountainhead of modern tying law.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).

57. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,
498 (1969); Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097, rehearingdenied, 430 U.S. 960 (1977); Hill v. A-T0, Inc., 535 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1976).
58. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
59. Id. at 5.
60. E.g., Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d 277, 287
(3d Cir. 1978).
61. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847, 850 (N.D. Cal.
1970); affd, 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972)
(justification alleged herein was that the arrangement was a reasonable de-

vice for measuring and collecting revenue, was due to economic hardships
developing a new business and was necessary for the preservation of prod-

uct distinctiveness); cf. Susser v. Carrel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 511 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965) (distin-

guishing tying agreements from other antitrust violations such as price
fixing, because a tie-in can be justified on occasion). See also Comment,

FranchiseTie-Ins and Antitrust: A CriticalAnalysis, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 847,
862 (justification an added element in tying doctrine after Susser and
Siegel).
62. E.g., Susser v. Carrel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
affd, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
381 U.S. 125 (1965).
63. This is commonly known as the "goodwill" or "quality control" defense. See generally Comment, Trademark Licensing: The Problem of Ade-
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not always found favor with the courts. 64 As the court in Siegel
quate Control, 1968 DUKE L.J. 875 (regulating supplies through "quality
control" before and after passage of the Lanham Act). However, the
Supreme Court's limitation on the use of this defense will severely curtail
its availability in the real estate tying context; ensuring a uniform franchise
image requires land development by the franchisor. The Court has stated
that "[t] he only situation, indeed, in which the protection of good will may
necessitate the use of tying clauses is where specifications for a substitute
would be so detailed that they could not practically be supplied." Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1946). In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972), the
court followed this rationale in rejecting a quality control defense for the
supply of paper products, holding that although a franchisor has the right
and duty to preserve distinctiveness and uniformity surrounding his trademark, "restraint of trade can be justified only in the absence of less restrictive alternatives." Id. at 51. Thus, where leasing arrangements can be made
to ensure quality, recognition, and uniformity of the trademark franchise,
the goodwill defense will have little force. But see Keener v. Sizzler Steak
Houses, 424 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Tex. 1977) affd in part, remanded in part on
other grounds, 597 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1979), wherein a restaurant franchisor's
policy of using a designated construction company was upheld where no
interest in the construction business was attributed to defendant, and the
contractor had significant experience in construction of "new image" buildings. See also note 99 infra.
64. Another form of justification, recognized by even fewer courts, is the
"new business defense," used by recently established businesses to stimulate the economy or encourage product development. See United States v.
Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365
U.S. 567 (1961) (leading case in "new business defense" area). See also
Note, Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-Ins, Franchise, Territorials, and Exclusives, 18 STAN. L. REv. 457, 473 (1966) (defense only applicable until goodwill of industry no longer in danger or less restrictive
alternatives become available). However, the severe time limitation generally associated with use of the new business defense, restricts its applicability in the trademark franchising area. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,
448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
Another defense which has been raised in the trademark franchise setting, although not a form of justification, is the statute of limitations. Section 4b of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15b (1970), requires that treble
damage antitrust suits be brought within four years after the cause of action accrues. In determining when a cause of action "accrues" for purposes
of the Clayton Act, courts have held that the statute of limitations begins to
run "when the injury is inflicted," Baldwin v. Loew's, Inc., 312 F.2d 387, 39091 (7th Cir. 1963), "when the plaintiff first has the right to bring an action,"
Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 1955 Trade Cas. § 67,960 (N.D.
Ill. 1955. Jan. 13, 1955), affd, 229 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1956), or "when the last
overt act causing injury or damage occurs." Fontana Aviation, Inc. v.
Baldinelli, 418 F. Supp. 464, 468 (W.D. Mich. 1976), af'd, 575 F.2d 1194 (6th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 911 (1978).
However, in Imperial Point Collonades Condominium, Inc. v.
Mangurian, 594 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'g 407 F. Supp. 870 (S.D. Fla.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977), the Fifth Circuit held that the continued enforcement of leases constituted acts which established a course of
conduct upon which a continued antitrust violation could be based. Id. at
1043. The court found that each act of collecting rent gave rise to a new
cause of action for conspiracy, even though the defendant selling the tied
product was not a party to the tying contract itself but rather a separate
legal entity. As such, the corporation could not escape liability under the
antitrust laws through the statute of limitations by dividing itself into two
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v. Chicken Delight, Inc.65 noted in examining the parameters of
the plaintiff's burden: "The relevant question is not whether the
items are essential to the franchise, but whether it is essential to
the franchise that the items be purchased from Chicken Delight."66
The current McDonald's litigation 67 has already focused
upon each of the major elements of a tying claim. Novel approaches in the field of trademark franchising have been ap69
plied,68 and inconsistent district court decisions have resulted.
The problems of developing each element in a real estate tying
claim must therefore be explored.
THE ELEMENTS OF THE TYING CLAIM IN THE MCDONALD'S

LITIGATION: DEVELOPMENTS, PROBLEMS, AND
INCONSISTENCIES

Two Distinct Products
In order to establish the existence of an unlawful tying
agreement, plaintiff must first demonstrate that there are two
separate products involved, with the availability of the tying
70
product being conditioned upon purchase of the tied product.
separate entities and requiring the plaintiff, by a contract with one defendant, to buy the tied product from "a legally separate but either controlled or
controlling defendant." Id. The court wholly rejected the finding below
that a plaintiff could sit on his rights while allowing treble damages to accumulate, adhering to the rule that plaintiffs may sue only for damages resulting from acts committed four years prior to commencement of the suit. Id.
at 1044. For an application of the "Eisen rule," Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156 (1976) (no preliminary inquiry into merits of a suit in order to
determine a motion for class certification), in a statute of limitations context, see Wenning v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 110, 113 (S.D. Ind.
1978) ("Eisen rule" inapplicable because limitation question involves far
lesser inquiry, relates directly to class action determination in that defense
may relate only directly to named plaintiff thus destroying "typicality", and
question of limitation viewed as procedural under applicable law).
65. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
66. Id. at 49.
67. See notes 32-48 and accompanying text supra.
68. See notes 70-99 & 100-35 and accompanying text infra.
69. Compare notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra with notes 36-37
and accompanying text supra.
70. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394
U.S. 495 (1969) (FortnerI). In the FortnerI case, for example, a subsidiary
corporation of United States Steel conditioned credit availability for the
purchase of land by Fortner on the purchase of prefabricated homes manufactured by United States Steel. See also Foster v. Maryland State Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 590 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979),
wherein a requirement that borrowers pay attorney's fees even if they retained their own counsel was found to be incidental and inseparable from a
loan transaction, and therefore not a "tied product."
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In Principe v. McDonald's Corp.,7 1 defendants were faced with
the claim that the requirement that franchisees lease the land
and restaurant building from McDonald's affiliate, as a condition
to obtaining a franchise, was an illegal tying agreement under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 72 The court directed a verdict for
the defendants, holding that this arrangement did not involve
two distinct products because the lease agreement merely
formed one part of the "bundle of benefits" that makes up a McDonald's franchise. 73 Phillips v. Crown Central Petroleum
Corp.74 was cited as indicating that a franchise must always
consist of an aggregation of products, and the court noted that,
in McDonald's case, this bundle is tremendous in size and therefore capable of being divided into almost innumerable compo75
nents.
In Principe,the court observed that it is arguable that various products and services are tied to the right to use McDonald's trademark. 76 The court noted that, although all such items
were obviously attainable on the open market, one must look to
a tying claim in the franchise field "with a view that is not unduly influenced by everything else that has been written" about
the law of tying. 77 The court concluded that a "franchise agreement" must be differentiated from a "tying agreement" in that
the first element of the latter, separability, is absent. 78 The court
felt that any other conclusion would be the death knell for the
necessarily contemfranchising concept, because franchising
79
plates an aggregation of benefits.
The Principe court's carte blanche approval of any and all
items as acceptable within a franchise agreement is inconsistent
with prior case law. The contention that the commodity sought
by the franchisee is an entire package of products is not new to
the courts.8 0 In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,81 regarded by
most courts and commentators as the basis for trademark
71. No. 78-0601 (E.D. Va. July 27, 1979).

72. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
73. Record of Trial Proceedings, vol. xvii at 2616; Principe v. McDonald's
Corp., No. 78-0601 (E.D. Va. July 27, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Record].
74. 602 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1979). The Phillips case involved an antitrust
suit brought by independent gasoline dealers against their wholesale supplier. Horizontal price fixing and an illegal tie-in of Crown brand motor oil
were alleged.
75. Record, supra.note 73, at 2613.
76. Id. at 2615.
77. Id. at 2616.

78. Id. at 2618.
79. Id. at 2619.
80. See, e.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211 (3d
Cir. 1976) (franchisor claimed that the license to use Dunkin' Donuts trademark along with underlying real estate, equipment, signs, and supplies con-
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franchising law in the last decade, 82 the court was faced with the
contention that the trademark and license of the franchisor was
not separate and distinct from the equipment, packaging, and
mixes used in the franchise. 83 Chicken Delight contended that
application of the tying doctrine to the sale of a franchise was
the equivalent of applying antitrust rules to the "sale of a car
'8 4
with its tires" or "a left shoe with the right.
The Siegel court recognized that although trademark
licenses did not fit the traditional category of tying products,
functionally they were sufficiently similar to constitute a tying
product. 85 It was noted that whereas a trademark had originally
been a strict emblem of the source of the product, the widespread commercial growth of trademarks had resulted in a new
meaning: representation of product quality and the benefit of
good will attached to the trademark. 86 The Siegel court felt that
as long as the franchise lived up to the standards represented by
the trademark, neither the protection afforded the trademark by
law nor its value to the licensee depended upon the source of
the components. 8 7 Therefore, it concluded that the "sale of a
franchise license, with the attendant rights to operate a business in the prescribed manner and to benefit from the goodwill
of the trade name, in no way requires the forced sale by the
franchisorof some or all of the component articles."88
Recently in Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co.,8 9 the
court was faced with a tie-in claim regarding the Baskin-Robbins trademark and ice cream sold thereunder. 90 The court in-

stituted a "single product"); Abecrombie v. Lum's, Inc., 531 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.
1976) (furniture, fixtures, supplies, and site development).
81. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
82. See, e.g., Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ill.
1979). See also note 210 infra. But see notes 89-94 and accompanying text
infra.
83. 448 F.2d at 47-48.

84. Id. at 48.
85. Id. at 48-49.
86. Id. at 48 (citing McCarthy, supra note 3, at 1112-13); Note, Quality
Controland The Antitrust Laws in Trade-mark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171
(1963). See also note 1 supra.
87. 448 F.2d at 49.
88. Id. (emphasis added). Many courts have followed the Siegel approach. See, e.g., McAlpine v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 461 F. Supp.
1232 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (trademark separate and distinct); Chock Full

O'Nuts Corp., Inc., 83 F.T.C. 575 (1973) (trademark, separately marketable,
constitutes tying item).
89. 1979-2 Trade Cas.

62,806 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 1979).

90. The district court had previously denied a motion for class certification with respect to tying allegations involving store leases, equipment, sup-

plies, and advertising, finding that individual questions predominated
under Rule 23 (b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978). This later deci-
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terpreted Siegel as holding that a trademark may be a separate
product, but "not that as a matter of law it must be." 91 Noting
the distinction between cases involving product-origin or identity trademarks and market-format trademarks, the court
treated the issue of separability as one of factual inquiry. 92 The
court found that the plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden of
proof on the issue of separability, as the case involved a trademark representing a product which was the distinctive underlying basis of the defendant's business. 93 Interestingly, the court
noted that were it considering a tie-in claim between the trademark and items other than ice cream, a different result might
94
have been reached.
The leasing agreement in the McDonald's antitrust litigation
involves precisely the type of tied product the Krehl court had
contemplated. Even rejecting the separability concept as a matter of law, it is clear that leasing agreements fit squarely within
the "market-format" trademark type case. Surely, McDonald's
would be hard pressed to persuasively argue that the public envisions a real estate empire when viewing McDonald's golden
arches.
It is apparent that the Principedecision is inconsistent with
the majority of cases that have encountered the separability
problem. Furthermore, the Principe court's reliance upon Phillips v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp.95 as to the product separability issue is misplaced. Although the Phillips court reversed
a district court finding of an existing illegal tying arrangement, 96
the court based its decision on the absence of sufficient economic power in the tying product market. 97 Whereas the Phillips court noted that the very essence of a franchise is the
sion, considered as a class action, was solely confined to the ice cream
claim.
91. 1979-2 Trade Cas. 62,806 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 1979). See also Joe Westbrook, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 419 F. Supp. 824, 835 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Detroit
City Dairy, Inc. v. Kowalski Sausage Co., 393 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Mich. 1975).

92. Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 1979-2 Trade Cas.

62,806

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 1979).

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 602 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1979).
96. Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 426 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Md.
1977). The district court concluded that the defendant had more than sufficient economic power in the gasoline market to appreciably restrain competition in the market for Crown brand motor oil. See note 74 supra.
97. Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1979).
The court of appeals found the tying product to be the service station leases
granted by Crown, rather than gasoline, Crown's principal "business product." This could have constituted a vital determination in the tying claim.
The court held, however, that even if gasoline was considered to be the tying product, Crown's share of the market was insufficient to provide "suffi-

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 13:607

purchase of several related products in a single, competitively
attractive package, it explicitly stated that the existence of a tying agreement was an uncontested issue.9 8 Even assuming
there is an emerging trend in the law of tie-ins, Phillips gives no
indication that any aggregation of products will be considered a
single franchise package9 9 under the Sherman Act. As a matter
of law or under factual inquiry, the McDonald's trademark and
the underlying lease should be considered as constituting two
separate products.
Sufcient Economic Power
Plaintiffs in a tying claim must establish that the defendant
has sufficient economic power in the tying product to make coercion effective as to the tied product. 10 0 The court will focus on
whether the seller has sufficient power to raise prices or impose
onerous terms which could not have been anticipated in a wholly competitive market. 1 1 The Supreme Court has, however, until recently, gradually decreased the requisite burden of
cient economic power." Id. at 629. For a factual discussion of this latter
element see note 135 infra.
98. 602 F.2d at 628.
99. Id. at 627. The "single package" concept often appears to be more
intrinsically related to "economic power" determinations than as evidence
of separability for purposes of a tying claim. See note 109 infra. Nor is the
leasing agreement comparable to items which may not be regarded as commodities distinct from the trademark. For example, in Kypta v. McDonald's
Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas. 62,827 (S.D. Fla. Sept 4, 1979), the court rejected a
claim that a $15,000 security deposit, allegedly tied to the trademark license,
constituted a separate item, holding that such deposit was merely part of
the consideration for the franchise. See also note 208 infra. In Beefy Trail,
Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 799, 805-07 (M.D. Fla. 1972), the
court allowed a franchisor to sell his trademark license solely upon the condition that the franchisee also purchase the necessary fixtures. However,
although the court recognized this package as an "operating franchise", the
decision was narrowed to authorize such an arrangement where the
franchise was to be resold after six months, lest it be considered merely an
attempt to avoid Siegel. But see In re 7-Eleven Franchise Antitrust Litigation, 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,429 (N.D. Cal), wherein franchisees alleged the
illegal tie-in of store locations, equipment, fixtures, signs, advertising, accounting services, and insurance to the grant of the trademark and
franchise. The court, emphasizing the importance of maximizing the gross
profits of both parties, found that an "overall package" had been bargained
for and sold. In granting summary judgment for the defendants on the tiein claim, the court distinguished Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., as a case in
which the franchise right was sold at a flat fee, coupled with an obligation to
purchase readily available tied items from the franchisor at an inflated
price. For a recent analysis of the role of coercion in the "complete package" context, see note 182 infra.
100. E.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S.
610 (1977) (Fortner II).

101. Cf. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495 (1969) (Fortner I).
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showing market power within the tying item. 10 2 Whereas early
Supreme Court decisions held that "monopolistic"10 3 or "dominant"'14 positions within the tying market were required, this
approach was wholly abandoned in Northern Pacific Railway v.
United States. 0 5 In that case, the Court held that a seller must
have sufficient economic power to appreciably restrain competition in the tied product market. 0 6 Although the cornerstone of
the presumption of market power in Northern Pacific was the
desirability and uniqueness of the railroad's extensive land
holdings in the northwestern United States, 10 7 the Court implied
that market power could be inferred from the mere existence of
numerous tying agreements. 0 8
It was not until nearly twenty years later that the Supreme
Court clarified this position. In United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises,Inc.,l0 9 the Court refused to view the tied product in isolation when determining whether burdensome terms
existed; rather, it explored the attractiveness of the entire pack102. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANITrRUST POUCY: AN ECONOMIC AND

LEGAL ANALYsIs 157 (1959) (approving of the trend).
103. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922) (de
facto monopoly required).
104. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953)
(market dominance required).
105. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
106. Id. at 6.
107. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), Northern
Pacific leased lands, which it held pursuant to a Congressional grant, solely
upon the condition that the lessee ship over railroad lines all commodities
produced or manufactured on the land, provided its rates were equal to
those of competing railways. These agreements were labeled "preferential
routing clauses." Id. at 3.
108. The Court felt that the "very existence" of a "host of tying arrangements" is "itself compelling evidence of defendant's great power," absent
other explanations. Id. at 7-8.
109. 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (FortnerII). FortnerII rejected any inference of
sufficient economic power in United States Steel Corporation in the credit
market, despite evidence that a significant number of buyers accepted prefabricated homes, the alleged tied product, as a condition to obtaining extremely attractive financing terms. The Court reasoned that any such
inference would necessarily depend on an "absence of other explanations
for the willingness of buyers to purchase the package." Id. at 618 n.10. The
explanation noted here was the price competition in the tied product market. Id. at 618. The Court determined that a finding of "economic power"
could not be supported unless evidenced by a showing of "some cost advantage over its competitors or significantly different than what other lenders
could offer if they so elected .... ." Id. at 622.
The FortnerII analysis may in some instances be applied in a trademark franchise context. Where initial franchise fees are very low, defendants can maintain that the desirability of the package, rather than
uniqueness of the "tying item," was the determinative factor in the sale.
However, in the McDonald's antitrust litigation, such an argument would
not appear to be convincing. See notes 114-35 and accompanying text infra.
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age. 110 The Court thus rejected the presumption of market
power it apparently had established in its earlier decision in
Fortner Enterprises,Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,"' where
market power was seemingly inferred from an appreciable
112
number of buyers who accepted the combination package.
However, the test for establishing sufficient market power remained the same; market power could be established "whenever the seller can exert some power over some of the buyers in
the market, even if his power is not113complete over them and
over all other buyers in the market."
"Market power" can be established from an alternate source
in franchising arrangements, uniqueness of the trademark
owned by the franchisor. The court in Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc." 4 extended the presumption of market power that long attached to patents 1 5 and copyrights, 116 to trademarks. 117 Al110. The Fortner II Court concluded that "[tihe unusual credit bargain
offered to Fortner proves nothing more than a willingness to provide cheap
financing in order to sell expensive houses." 429 U.S. at 622.
111. 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (FortnerI).
112. In Fortner I, Justice Black stated in an often quoted, and perhaps
misinterpreted passage, that "[T] he proper focus of concern is whether the
seller has the power to raise prices, or impose other burdensome terms
such as a tie-in, with respect to any appreciablenumber of buyers within the
market." Id. at 504 (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court
has cited Professor Dam's article, FortnerEnterprisesv. United States Steel
Corp.: "Neither a Borrower, Nor a Lender Be," 1969 SUPREME COURT REV. 1,
25-26, for his insightful analysis of the plaintiff's burden of proof:
One important question in interpreting the Fortnerdecision is the
meaning of this language. Taken out of context, it might be thought to
mean that, just as the 'host of tying arrangements' was 'compelling evidence' of 'great power' in Northern Pacific, so the inclusion of tie-in
clauses in contracts with 'any appreciable number of buyers' establishes market power. But the passage read in context does not warrant
this interpretation. For the immediately preceding sentence makes
clear that market power in the sense ofpower over price must still exist.
If the price could have been raisedbut the tie-in was demanded in lieu
of the higher price, then-and presumably only then--would the requisite
economic power exist.
FortnerII, 429 U.S. at 620 n.13 (emphasis added). For a recent application of
Fortner II analysis in a trademark setting, see note 124 infra. See also
Flinn, Fortner: Sufficient Economic Power Over The Tying Product,46 ANTiTRUST L.J. 605 (1977) (impact of FortnerII).
113. Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 503.
114. 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
115. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). International Salt developed a patented salt utilization machine and conditioned
any lease upon the obligation to purchase all salt requirements from the
company.
116. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (conditioning sale of
copyrighted films on purchase of inferior films); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (copyrighted motion pictures).
117. "Just as the patent or copyright forecloses competitors from offering
the distinctive product on the market, so the registered trademark presents
a legal barrier against competition." 448 F.2d at 50.

1980]

McDonald's Antitrust Litigation

though strict adherence to the Siegel holding could effectively
remove the market power issue from the field of trademark
franchising, the Supreme Court's reminder in Fortner II that
"uniqueness confers economic power only when other competitors are in some way prevented from offering the distinctive
product themselves"'1 8 casts doubt upon Siegel's "matter of
law" approach. Clearly a trademark will not in all cases be associated with a product that can meet this uniqueness criteria." 9
Even prior to Fortner II, some courts had strongly rejected
the presumption theory in search of evidence of the franchisor's
preeminence in his particular field. In Capital Temporaries,Inc.
of Hartford v. Olsten Corp., 20 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the Siegel approach, maintaining that the Supreme Court has never
presumed economic power other than in the patent or copyright
contexts. 121 Conversely, the Olsten court relied on United Drug
Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 1 22 where the Court stated that a
trademark right is not "a right in gross or at large, like a statutory copyright or a patent for an invention .... There is no such
thing as a property in a trademark except as a right appurtenant
to an established business or trade in connection with which the
mark is employed."1 23 As a result, the Olsten court found that
the trademark merely identified the franchisor and was therefore an insufficient indication of dominance over the tying product "to qualify for per se treatment under the Northern Pacific
118. 429 U.S. at 621 (citing Fortner1, 394 U.S. 495, 505 n.2).
119. See Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1976) affid in
part, rev'd in part, and remanded in part on other grounds, 567 F.2d 1316
(1978) (en banc), wherein the franchisor of a seafood restaurant chain required franchisees to purchase the underlying premises and all equipment
and supplies in order to receive the license to use the franchise trademark.
The court held that the trademark, in itself, was insufficient to establish

"sufficient economic power" within the tying item. Id. at 48. Factors which

the court considered were the trademark as a legal barrier to competition,

the goodwill attached to the mark, and the fact that the franchisor was able
to require franchisees to purchase goods at prices substantially higher than
market value. Id. at 50-51. See also Langley, Trying a Tying Case, 46 ANrxTRUST L.J. 619, 623 (1977) (sufficient economic power should always be a requirement outside the trademark). Contra Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v.
Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 463 F.2d 1002, 1015 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972) (sufficient economic power from mere existence
of a trademark).
120. 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974). Capital Temporaries, licensee of employ-

ment service businesses, alleged an illegal tie-in of a blue collar operation in
order to obtain the exclusive license and use of the operator's trade name
and trademark to operate a white collar franchise.
121. Id. at 663.
122. 248 U.S. 90 (1918).

123. Id. at 97.
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rubric. ' 124 After looking beyond the trademark, it was determined that the defendant's business was not attractive, unique,
or effective enough to warrant a finding of market power in the
25
tying product market.
Under either approach for establishing market power, it is
difficult to understand the utilization in Principe v. McDonald's
Corp,126 of a lack of sufficient economic power as an alternative
basis for directing a verdict for the defendants. 127 The court
chose to search for the relevant market, only to find a lack of
proof of McDonald's dominance. 128 This question was routinely
disposed of in Martino v. McDonald's System, Inc.12 9 by following Siegel and holding that the McDonald's trademark was sufficiently unique to presume that proof of market dominance
existed on a classwide basis. 130 In Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice
Cream Co., 13 1 although the court was unwilling to rely entirely

on the use of presumptions, it found that the Baskin-Robbins
trademark, when coupled with "such nationwide preeminence
in the retail sale of ice cream market," provided sufficient economic power as a matter of law. 13 2 Even assuming the McDon133
ald's trademark is not sufficiently unique in the Fortnersense
124. 506 F.2d at 663.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington
recently rejected the Siegel matter of law approach in denying a motion for
class certification. Cash v. Arctic Circle, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas.

63,094

(E.D. Wash. Aug. 28, 1979). The court distinguished the goals of patents and
copyrights, which confer economic power upon those who have created
unique products, from the goal of trademarks, which prevent the piracy of

trade names from competitors. Id. at 63,095. The court expressly relied on
Fortner H, 429 U.S. 610, 619-22, in determining that sufficient economic
power is a jury question unless the evidence warrants a directed verdict.
125. 506 F.2d at 663.
126. No. 78-0601 (E.D. Va. July 27, 1979).
127. Record, note 73, at 2618.
128. Id. For a similar problem with a different result, see Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. 63,089 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14,1979), where the
court rejected a contention that the relevant market that a soft ice cream

truck franchisor would be measured against was the entire retail ice cream
market in the franchisor's area. The court, believing that the defendants
were seeking to blur the distinction between mobile units and retail stores
and between franchisees and owner-operators, found that "such distinctions are crucial to appreciating the economic power which Mister Softee
could exert over prospectivefranchisees."
129. 81 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ill. 1979).

130. Id. at 90.
131. 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
132. Id. at 120.
133. It would appear that a court's proper focus in a tying claim after
FortnerH would not be whether the franchisor possesses a trademark, but
whether such a trademark will be so unique that at least some buyers will
be influenced thereby to accept the tied product item in lieu of a higher
price for the trademark license. See Flinn, Fortner: Sufficient Economic
Power Over The Tying Product, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 605, 617-18 (1977) (Mr.
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to presume its market dominance, surely when coupled with
consideration of McDonald's share of the fast-food chain mar135
ket,1 34 economic power could be inferred as a matter of law.
A "Not Insubstantial"Amount of Interstate Commerce
The next tying claim requirement is establishing that a "not
insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce is affected in the
market for the tied item. 136 The "not insubstantial" test, however, does not refer to percentage or market share but is measured solely in terms of total dollar volume of tied sales. 13 7 The
minimum dollar amount in the tied product market has so drastically declined that any past difficulty in showing a significant
13 8
effect upon interstate commerce may be presently ignored.
The substantiality test as set forth by the Supreme Court in
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 13 9 provided: "[N]ormally the controlling consideration is simply
Flinn, who represented United States Steel Corp. in FortnerII, stresses the
importance of showing economic power in the sense of some "power over
price," a showing which would necessarily depend upon the particular
trademark involved).
134. In 1976, McDonald's share of the fast-food chain market was 19.6%,
more than twice that of its nearest competitor, Kentucky Fried Chicken,
8.4%. See BUSINESS WEEK 56 (July 11, 1977).
135. In Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616 (4th Cir.
1979), the court declined to find sufficient market power in a 4% share of
service station business, holding that a prior ruling, Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960) (10%), represented a showing close to
the permissible minimum. 602 F.2d at 629. Interestingly, in the trademark
franchising context, in Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977), Kentucky Fried Chicken conceded
that its economic power was sufficient to satisfy tying requirements. Id. at
377. See note 134 supra. In McAlpine v. AAMCO Transmissions, 461 F.
Supp. 1232 (E.D. Mich. 1978), the court held that "sufficient economic
power" will be satisfied when the trademark offered is "well known" and
"uniquely desirable."
136. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). The connection to be shown with interstate commerce may be established by demonstrating that the anticompetitive conduct occurred in interstate commerce
or by showing that the conduct, although wholly intrastate, had a not insubstantial effect on interstate commerce. Joe Westbrook, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 419 F. Supp. 825, 836 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
137. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495, 501 (1969); Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832, 841 (4th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961).
138. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395
(1947) ($500,000 minimum to justify per se treatment). See text accompanying note 141 infra. But see Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 519 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 391 U.S. 125 (1965) (tied
sales of $1,354,599 held insubstantial as a result of one per cent capture of
ice cream market). See also notes 134-35 and accompanying text supra.
The market percentage test was expressly rejected, however, by Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969).
139. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
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whether a total amount of business, substantial enough in terms
of dollar volume so as not to be merely de minimis, is foreclosed
to competitors by the tie ....-140 The Court held that sales of
$190,000 in prefabricated homes, the tied product, were not insubstantial. 141 The Fortner I decision further lessened plaintiffs' burden by holding that substantiality was to be measured
by the "total volume of sales tied by the sales policy," rather
than solely by the portion of this total plaintiff's practice accounted for. 14 2 Additionally, the existence of tying arrangements with an appreciable number of buyers, although no
143
longer a viable method of showing sufficient economic power,
should permit an inference that a "not insubstantial" amount of
interstate commerce was affected. 144
The question in the McDonald's antitrust litigation of
whether a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce
was affected is readily determinable. The imposition of twentyyear leasehold agreements upon franchisees has by Mr. Kroc's
admission catapulted the Franchise Realty Corporation from a
45
$1,000 paid-in capital corporation to a $170 million interest.
Franchise Realty buys property, establishes leases, and collects
rentals in interstate commerce. Participation is based upon the
tied product imposed upon McDonald's franchisees. The effect
on interstate commerce is clearly not insubstantial.
ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS:

COERCION AND FACT OF DAMAGE

Coercion
Although reference has been
"coercion" on the part of the seller
within the law of tying remains
Court cases indicated that the crux
ment was the "forced purchase"' 47

made in numerous cases to
46
this concept's precise role
undefined. Early Supreme
of an unlawful tying arrangeof tied products with the de-

140. Id. at 501.
141. Id. at 501-02.
142. Id. at 502.
143. See notes 107-12 and accompanying text supra.

144. FortnerII dealt exclusively with the issue of whether United States
Steel had sufficient economic power in the credit market. The de minimus
test established in Fortner I is geared solely to total dollar volume and
therefore allows inference from an appreciable number of buyers.
145. See GRINDING IT OUT, supra note 23, at 82-83.
146. See note 53 supra. Some commentators have expressed the opinion
that coercion, neither legally nor in terms of economic policies, should be a

requisite element in the law of tying. See, e.g., Note, Tying Arrangements
and the Individual Coercion Doctrine, 30 VAND.L. REV. 755, 783-94 (1977)
(legal and antitrust policy basis). Contra Varner, Voluntary Ties and The
Sherman Act, 50 S.CAL. L. REV. 271, 299 (1977) (necessary requirement).
147. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
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sired tying items. Lower courts have subsequently established
such rules as "coercion must influence the buyers choice" 148 and
the plaintiff must be "the unwilling purchaser of the tied product.' 49 However, insufficient practical guidelines were offered
regarding the buyer's unwillingness and how he must be influenced. 150 Possibilities have ranged from the mere acceptance of
a conditional sale' 5 ' to outright objection 52 or negotiation for al153
ternatives.
The use of presumptions in establishing coercion is similarly marked by confusion. The major line of cases has held that
when contractual provisions contain an unlawful tie-in, "coer154
cion" can be inferred since it is backed by the force of law.
(1953), where the Court stated that "[t] he common core of the adjudicated
unlawful tying arrangements is the forced purchase of a second distinct
commodity with the desired purchase of a dominant "tying" product. ..."
Id. at 614. See generally notes 9 & 53 supra; see also United States v.
Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). The Loew's Court stated that "[tielevision
stations forced by appellants to take unwanted films were denied access to
films marketed by other distributors who, in turn, were foreclosed from selling to the stations." Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
148. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount
Theatres, Inc., 446 F.2d 1131, 1137 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063
(1972). The court dismissed an alleged tie-in claim surrounding a requirement that plaintiff sponsor an early evening news program in order to obtain a desired sponsorship over other ABC affiliated stations.
149. Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 663 (2d Cir.
1974). The franchise agreement in Olsten did not expressly require the tied
product item but merely gave the plaintiff an option to buy; the court, therefore, refused to presume coercion, and no evidence of extrinsic coercion
was presented. See note 120 supra.
150. See, e.g., Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658 (2d
Cir. 1974) (court did not decide the question of when the buyer is actually
"unwilling"). But see American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 446 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1063 (1972)). The court noted that the plaintiff did not "seriously bargain" for the elimination of the unwanted sponsorships and determined
that the franchisee was not "influenced" by the alleged tie-in. Id. at 1133.
151. E.g., Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d 277, 287
(3d Cir. 1978) (express condition sufficient without further evidence of coercion); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 708 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978) (conditioning one product on sale
of another).
152. See Response of Carolina v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307,
1327 (5th Cir. 1976) (inquiring as to whether plaintiff expressly objected to
imposition of tied product); Davis v. Marathon Oil, 528 F.2d 395 (6th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) (coercion requires more than aggressive salesmanship).
153. See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 112 (E.D.
Pa. 1975), rev'd, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) (posing the question of whether active negotiations are essential to a showing of
coercion).
154. See, e.g., Hi-Co Enterprises v. Can-Agra, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas.
61,053 (S.D. Ga. July 26, 1976); Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc.,
1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,254 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 1974); In re 7-Eleven Franchise
Antitrust Litigation, 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,429 (N.D. Calif. Dec. 23, 1974).
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However, when alternative sources might be used under prescribed conditions, courts may be unwilling to employ blanket
presumptions. 155 The minority view has rejected any presumption of coercion, even when tie-ins were explicitly found in contracts, and requires a showing of coercion outside of the
agreement. 5 6 In some cases an inference of coercion has been
drawn from the existence of a "uniform policy" to impose tying
arrangements. 157 In Hill v. A-T-O, Inc.,158 the defendant's uniform piactice of selling vacuum cleaners along with buying plan
memberships led to a reversal of a lower court finding of an absence of coercion. 159 The decision in Fortner 11,160 however,
161
seems to militate against such a finding in future cases.
Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. 162 is presently the
major precedent on the requirement of coercion in tying cases.
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant granted franchises on the
condition that the franchisees also purchase equipment and
supplies and sublease the underlying premises at a substantial
markup. 163 Interestingly, the Ungar court noted that the
"equipment package" provision was removed from the franchise
agreements in response to the litigation in Siegel v. Chicken De-

155. See note 149 supra. But see Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America,
Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1216 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976). The court
closely examined the alternatives offered to the franchisee and found such

sources "woefully inadequate." Plaintiffs were given a 30 day option to obtain an equipment package elsewhere, were pressured into non-exercise of
such option, and had only one approved equipment vendor other than the
franchisor, and there was evidence he would not deal directly with plaintiffs.
156. See Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443, 450-51 (M.D. Ga.
1975), appeal dismissed, 557 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1977) (in action alleging ty-

ing of feed supplies to advancement of loans, court found a contractual fee
insufficient absent a showing of "actual coercion outside of contractual provisions"); accord, Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658,
665-66 (2d Cir. 1974) (dictum).
157. Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81, 88-89 (N.D. Ill. 1979)

(uniform policy along with contractual provisions gave rise to class-wide

inference of coercion); see Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Diversified Packag-

ing, 549 F.2d 368, 377 (5th Cir. 1977) ("A tie claimant establishes a tie when it
proves that a franchisor makes a practice of coercing franchisees into
purchasing supplies or other products from the franchisor.").
158. 535 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1976).

159. Id. at 1355.
160. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610
(1977).

161. See notes 109 & 110 supra. Although the FortnerII Court dealt spe-

cifically with "sufficient economic power," its emphasis in looking beyond

the availability of the "tied product" in favor of examining the attractiveness of the package, means that "coercion" should not be presumed merely
from the mode of the franchisor's offer.
162. 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,

429 U.S. 823 (1976).
163. 531 F.2d at 1215.
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light, Inc. 16 4 The district court 165 in Ungar had found that plaintiffs needed only to show that economic power had been used by
the seller, not that it was used coercively. 166 The court based its
findings on FTC v. Texaco, Inc.,167 a non-tying case 168 where the
Supreme Court found the relationship between franchisor and
franchisee inherently coercive, 169 and Perma Life Muffler, Inc. v.
InternationalParts Corp.,170 in which the Court permitted the
plaintiff to recover although it had willingly entered into a tying
164. Id. at 1215-16 (citing Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722
(N.D. Cal. 1967), modified sub nom. Chicken Delight, Inc. v. Harris, 412 F.2d
830 (9th Cir. 1969), on modification,311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 955 (1972). See also Photovest Corp. v. Fotomot Corp., 606 F.2d 704,
721 (7th Cir. 1979) (franchisor Fotomat, apparently with knowledge of
Siegel, wrote a letter to Photovest advising that they could use any processor they wished despite express contractual provisions to the contrary).
165. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa.

1975).
166. Id. at 97. In the recent decision of Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc.,
1980-1 Trade Cas. 63,089, (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1979), the district court, commenting that all which could be said with absolute certainty regarding the
concept of coercion was that it proved to be "elusive," stated that coercion
was not a separate element in a tying claim. The court then went on to find,
however, that clearly, under the facts in Esposito, defendants engaged in a
course of conduct "designed to coerce the plaintiffs into adhering to the tiein arrangement," and that plaintiff purchased the tied products "only reluctantly" and "because of fear of franchise termination or other reprisal."
Under the court's analysis, Hill v. A-T-O, Inc., 535 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1976),
stood for the proposition that only an unremitting policy to impose a tie-in
must accompany sufficient market power in the tying product market, and
that such an unremitting policy need not necessarily translate into "cqercion." For a different interpretation of Hill, see notes 157-59 and accompanying text supra.
167. 393 U.S. 223 (1968). The FTC challenged Texaco's sales commission
agreements, with B.F. Goodrich Co., to sponsor its tires, batteries, and accessories to be used by Texaco dealers.
168. Suit was brought under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1970), alleging an unfair method of competition based upon the
leverage Texaco enjoyed over its dealers.
169. See FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968). The Court stated that
"[wjith the dealer's supply of gasoline, his lease on his station, and his Texaco identification subject to continuing review, we think itflies in the face of
common sense to say, as Texaco asserts, that the dealer is "perfectlyfree" to
reject Texaco's chosen brand of TBA." Id. at 229. (emphasis added). But
see Dubuque Communications Corp., v. American Broadcasting Cos., 432 F.
Supp. 543, 546 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (coercion not inferable from economic inequalities of parties to a contract).
170. 392 U.S. 134 (1968), rev'g 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1967). Midas dealers
alleged the tie-in of Midas' mufflers to other products in their line. The
court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendants based on the
doctrine of in pari delicto, finding plaintiffs equally at fault based upon
their participation in the alleged restraint. The Supreme Court reversed,
finding nothing in the language of the antitrust laws which indicated that
Congress intended to make the in pari delecto doctrine an antitrust defense. 392 U.S. at 138.
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arrangement. 17 1 The Third Circuit 172 reversed the district court,
thereby rejecting Texaco 173 and Perma Life Mufflers 174 as support for the position that coercion was not required in the tying
context. The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari 175 technically
reaffirmed the requirement of showing some form of coercion in
a tying claim.
In the McDonald's litigation, the defendant corporation expressly required franchisees to lease the underlying premises
pursuant to the franchise agreement. 76 This provision existed
in the franchise agreement when the litigation began. 177 Furthermore, corporate officers testified that since 1961 McDonald's
had a uniform and unremitting policy of subleasing real estate
through the Franchise Realty Corporation. 78 In Martino v. McDonald's System, Inc., 179 the court found that this arrangement
was precisely the type where coercion could be inferred on a
classwide basis. 180 Noting that exceptions were allowed prior to
171. Id. at 139-40. The Court distinguished furthering restraint of trade

from willing participation in a tying agreement. Justice White concurred,
stating:
When those with market power and leverage persuade, coerce, or
influence others to cooperate in an illegal combination to their damage,
allowing recovery to the latter is wholly consistent with the purpose of
the antitrust laws, since it will deter those most likely to be responsible
for organizing forbidden schemes.
Id. at 145 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). One could logically infer from this statement that coercion is not required under antitrust policy
when "persuasion" or "influence" exists.
172. 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976).
173. Id. at 1219-21 (Texaco inapplicable to tying claim under § 1 of Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)).
174. 531 F.2d at 1221-22. (plaintiffs in Perma Life Mufflers willingly cooperated in tie-in, yet not entered voluntarily, therefore coercion still required).
175. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
176. See note 28 supra.
177. See note 31 supra.
178. See note 22 supra.
179. 81 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
180. Id. at 89. Establishing the element of coercion on a class-wide basis
presents problems for the antitrust plaintiff. In proving that class-wide coercion exists, along with other elements of the claim, the court must determine whether common questions predominate over individual questions, in
accordance with Rule 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
It is the burden of the plaintiff to show that the requirements of Rule
23(b) (3) are satisfied. Baxter v. Minter, 378 F. Supp. 1213, 1215 (D. Mass.
1974). Even where express tie-in provisions can be found within the terms
of the franchise agreement, a further inquiry must be made into whether
such provisions are uniform throughout the class. It is clear that the existence of substantially varying contracts among a large segment of franchisees may defeat a class action by requiring individual proof of coercion. In
Hehir v. Shell Oil Co., 72 F.R.D. 18 (D. Mass 1976), for example, the court
denied a motion for class certification by service station operators charging
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1961, the class was limited to persons acquiring franchises thereafter. 181 The Martino decision is clearly in line with precedents
inferring coercion. Provisions in McDonald's agreements explicitly conditioned the grant of franchise upon the lease and license, and no exceptions were permitted. 182 Yet, under the
narrowest interpretation of coercion, actual force shown
oil companies with illegal tying arrangements. Plaintiffs relied upon express tie-in provisions in leases to sell only Shell gasoline to protect the
trademark. The court, noting that such provisions were contained in at
least 35 types of documents, found that the potential variation among the
types of contractual forms was sufficient to defeat the contention that common questions predominated. "[E ]ven small variationsin contractual language can have large antitrust consequences." Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (rejecting class
certification which would have necessitated inspection of over 400 different
contractual forms); cf. Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443 (M.D.
Ga. 1975), appeal dismissed, 557 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1977) (40 different
forms); Abecrombie v. Lum's, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (12
Forms). See also Cash v. Arctic Circle, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. 63,094 (E.D.
Wash. Aug. 28, 1979), wherein the court denied a motion for class certification because four different franchise agreements, embodied in seven different contractual forms, existed among its franchisees. A major
consideration, however, was that portions of the proposed class were allowed to select alternative sources of supply when supplied by franchisor.
But see Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81, 88-89 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(class certified even though contract forms necessarily changed over years,
policy remained essentially same).
Where no express tying provisions are found within the terms of a
franchise agreement, some courts have rejected a motion for class certification based upon uniform business policy, finding individual proof of coercion is required. In Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 331
(N.D. Ill. 1974), the court certified a class as to a product tying claim, when
finding existence of a product tie-in franchise agreement, but it rejected
class certification as to an alleged leasing tying claim based upon business
practices. The court, relying on Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303
(1948), held that in order to establish an illegal tying arrangement arising
from business conduct, the franchisees must prove they were coerced and
not merely persuaded into purchasing the unwanted product. Because
franchisees signed both a franchise agreement and a leasing agreement, the
former not mentioning the latter, the court felt the case was not one of interpreting the legal effect of one standard clause of a contract. The court
noted that determining the antitrust consequences of the alleged lease tiein required a factual determination regarding each lease, in order to establish the requisite coercion. Establishing such proof, the court declared,
"will necessarily vary from franchise to franchise." 69 F.R.D. at 336 (emphasis added). Proof that franchisees were coerced did not establish coercion
as to others, and therefore individual questions predominated.
181. 81 F.R.D. at 89.
182. In Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), the
Seventh Circuit rejected the franchisor's contention that despite express
conractual language imposing a tie-in, no coercion existed because the franchisees desired a complete package. Id. at 724-25. Defendants were
charged with tying the leasing of Kiosks for photo processing to the trademark franchise. The court held that even if franchisees had desired a complete package, this would "not alter the proposition that were it not for its
desire to obtain the franchise it would not have agreed to the leasing provision." Id. at 725. The court further noted that the franchisor "could have
offered a 'complete package' without conditioning the franchise on the leas-
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"outside the agreement,"' 8 3 McDonald's may claim that franchisees voluntarily accepted the franchise package, and, therefore, no coercion existed. This argument, however, seems
tenuous at best.
Fact of Damage
The final element in a tying claim is a showing of "fact of
damage."'1 84 This requirement entails proof that the plaintiff
had actually suffered "some injury" that was causally related to
the defendant's antitrust violation. 8 5 Although section 4 of the
Clayton Act 186 allows recovery by "any person who shall be injured," courts as a matter of policy have imposed a standingtype requirement, limiting private actions to plaintiffs whose injury is not remote, indirect, or incidental. 187 However, if standing exists, the court is still limited to a factual inquiry on
suffered some loss as a consequence of dewhether plaintiff has
188
fendant's violation.
Plaintiffs do not have to show that the violation was the sole
cause of injury but only that it was a material one. 189 However,
showing that the violation was a material cause may not be
based upon speculation; the casual connection must be proved
factually with a fair degree of certainty. 9 0 There is no requirement, however, that such loss be personal or unique to the plaintiff as long as he has suffered some business or property loss.
ing agreement." Id. (emphasis added). One alternative suggested by the

court was to make the leasing arrangement optional. Id.
183. See note 156 and accompanying text supra.
184. See, e.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81
(N.D. Ill. 1979); accord, Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D.
108 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
185. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.; 561 F.2d 434, 454 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (action alleging unlawful tie-in of gas station sites
to gasoline purchases); cf. Abecrombie v. Lum's, Inc., 531 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.
1976) (allowing enforcement of fixed rentals not enforcing precise conduct

made unlawful under antitrust laws).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).

187. Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d 277 (3d Cir.
1978) (initial determination of whether plaintiff can recover); Bogosian v.

Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 454 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086
(1978) (policy expressed under the rubric of standing); Billy Baxter, Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,

401 U.S. 923

(1971) (business was in "target area" of defendants' illegal acts).
188. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1946).
See also Pollock, The "Injury"and "Causation"Elements of a Treble-Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U. L .REv. 691, 706-07 (1962) (approval of "target area" principle as aiding analysis of whether direct injury is present).

189. Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307,
1321 (5th Cir. 1976).
190. Id.
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Proof of "fact of damage is not concerned with any policy of limiting liability."' 9 '
In the McDonald's litigation, proof of fact of damage in the
real estate tying claim should be simplified due to the substantial markup of the leases 192 afforded to individual franchisees.
The court in Martino v. McDonald's System, Inc.' 93 was faced
with the claim that this markup included not only rent but also
constituted consideration for the entire package of operating
rights, services, and assistance received from the franchisor.
The following test was promulgated for use in determining fact
of damage in the context of a real estate tying claim in trademark franchising:
The plaintiffs can attempt to prove what the promotional and supervisory support provided by McDonald's is generally worth to a
franchisee. If after subtracting this sum the plaintiffs can prove
that the rent charged by McDonald's was still substantially higher
of
than what the franchisee would pay to a third
94 party, then the fact
damage requirement would be satisifed.
Pragmatically, fact of damage will usually be an evaluation
of the terms of the lease in conjunction with the relevant market
value. Where rentals blatantly exceed market values, a factor
easily determined, courts will be more inclined to routinely find
that fact of damage exists. However, where rental levels more
closely approach market value, other considerations may preclude a finding of fact of damage. Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice
Cream Co. 195 is illustrative of the latter situation. In Krehl, the
court denied a motion for class certification based upon an alleged tie-in of a sublease requiring a ten dollar per month "administrative surcharge."' 196 It found that such a surcharge would
not, taken by itself, assist the plaintiffs in showing fact of damage. 197 The court stated that the intermediate step in showing
that plaintiff was damaged was to determine whether the franchisee could have obtained the same or an equivalent site at the
rate at which the franchisor secured the prime lease.' 98 It was
noted that "the size and reputation of a tenant is a vitally impor199
tantfactor in determining the terms of a commercial lease."'
Thus, Krehl is a forewarning that courts should look beyond the
191. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 454 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
192. See note 26 supra.
1979).
193. 81 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ill.
194. Id. at 91-92.
195. 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978).

196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

121.
120.
120-21.
121.
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terms of a lease and evaluate the economic reality of doing business on a large scale basis. Nevertheless, since the leases offered by McDonald's exceeded market value by 30 per cent or
more, a finding of fact of damage, at least to individual franchisees, 200 is wholly warranted.
CONCLUSION

The role of the law of tying agreements in the trademark
franchise context should be clearly delineated by final disposition of the McDonald's litigation. The framework of McDonald's
franchise system is unique in several ways. Because McDonald's expressly provides for the imposition of a leasehold agreement within its franchise agreement, 20 ' coercion, even in the
strictest sense of the term, can be readily implied. 20 2 Furthermore, because of the tremendous amount of business generated
by the Franchise Realty Corporation, it is immediately apparent
that a "not insubstantial amount of commerce" has been affected in the tied product market. 20 3 In addition, proof of fact of
damage can be inferred from the substantial markup in the re204
alty.
The elements of substantial economic power and "two separate products" pose more significant problems for the McDonald's franchisees. Although it is not clear that courts have
stopped presuming sufficient economic power from the ownership of a trademark, 20 5 such a presumption is not supported by
the FortnerII decision. 20 6 A trademark in itself, unlike a patent
or copyright, does not necessarily impart upon the seller uniqueness per se in the product market needed to provide the economic power to impose non-competitive prices. As such, small
franchisors may not have sufficient economic power under Fortner. However, it is difficult to believe that McDonald's, the un200. A potentially recurring problem in class action tying claims is that
proof of fact of damage will be so individualized and complex that individual questions will predominate under Rule 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See note 180 supra. In Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 81
F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ill. 1979), the court granted plaintf's motion for class certification, finding that the alleged markup was sufficient to obviate the need for
individual proof, yet the court in Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 1979-2 Trade
Cas.

62,827 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 1977), found that despite the apparent

markup, the class action would nevertheless be unmanageable.,
201. See note 28 supra.
202. See note 154 and accompanying text supra.
203. See text accompanying note 145 supra. See notes 136-145 and accompanying text supra.
204. See note 26 supra. See notes 184-200 and accompanying text supra.
205. See note 119 supra. See notes 120-25 and accompanying text supra.

206. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610
(1977).

See note 133 supra.
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disputed leader in fast-food franchising, does not possess
sufficient power over pricing to at least influence some buyers to
accept the tied product. As such, the required showing of sufficient economic power should be established.
The ultimate question posed by the McDonald's litigation is
whether to adopt a black letter rule that a franchise necessarily
includes a "single combination package," regardless of the type
of items comprising the package. 20 7 Finding that a trademark
constitutes a separable product as a matter of law is unwarranted in the franchise setting. The trademark simply represents the uniform quality of the underlying product, and where
the alleged tied-item is the distinctive underlying basis of the
trademark, it is unrealistic to assume that a franchisee would
want or anticipate anything other than the combination package. Competition is not foreclosed in any manner distinguishable from other market situations Therefore, a single product
should be found to exist as a matter of law. 20 8 Where products
allegedly tied to the trademark are related thereto but seemingly accessible on the competitive market, the added element
of justification, and its requisite burden, is placed upon the
franchisor. 20 9 However, where a product is wholly accessible on
the competitive market, 210 but only required through the
franchisor's power to impose non-competitive prices, no basis
207. The argument that such a "combination package" is more convenient in that a franchiseemay invest in a business enterprise in which all
components are marketed together in one inseparable package was, even if
shown to be true, found insufficient to justify a tying arrangement. Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1347 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1097, hearingdenied, 430 U.S. 960 (1977).
208. In Kugler v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 460 F.2d 1214
(8th Cir. 1972), aff'g 337 F. Supp. 872 (D. Minn. 1971), the Eighth Circuit
affirmed summary judgment for a franchisor who allegedly tied national advertising sales to the right to use the AAMCO trade name. The court approvingly cited the district court's determination that "[a]dvertising was
not tied to the purchase of the license; it was the essence of the license." Id.
at 1215. Because the court agreed that the franchisee paid for AAMCO's
good name and the business resulting from being known on a national
scale, the court determined that "[f]or a stated consideration, AAMCO
agreed to provide, in a single package, a means and method of operating

and merchandising a transmission repair shop." Id. (emphasis added).
While affirming, the court noted that summary judgment should be used
sparingly in complex antitrust litigation. Compare this statement with
cases cited in note 99 supra.
209. See notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra.
63,089
210. See Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas.
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1979). The court, following Siegel v. Chicken Delight,Inc.,
448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972), held that paper
goods and novelties not manufactured by the defendant, wholly accessible
from outside dealers, and which the public had no reason to connect to the
trademark, constituted an illegal tie-in under the Sherman Act. See also
text accompanying notes 81-88 supra.
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exists for distinguishing the arrangement from traditional tyingtied product analysis. The McDonald's leasehold requirement
fits squarely within this latter category. Only a finding that
franchising methods enjoy general immunity from traditional
tying restrictions should insulate the corporation from liability.
Elliot R. Zinger

